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Gravity models have been widely used to describe bilateral trade in goods. Recently, Portes 
and Rey [1999] applied this framework to cross border equity flows and found that distance, 
which proxies information asymmetries in financial markets, is a surprisingly very large 
barrier to cross-border asset trade. We adopt here a different point of view and explore the 
complementarity between bilateral trade in goods and bilateral asset holdings. We jointly 
study trade in goods and banking assets in a simultaneous gravity equations framework using 
different instruments for both endogenous variables. To instrument trade in goods, we choose 
geographical variables (excluding distance) and data on bilateral transport costs. For asset 
holdings, we use legal similarities between countries and data on the international taxation of 
withheld capital. We find that the strong correlation between bilateral trade in goods and asset 
holdings is not simply due to distance: bilateral trade in goods generates bilateral asset 
holdings and vice versa. Those effects are of first order magnitude: a 10% increase in trade 
generates a 6 to 7% increase of asset holdings, and a 10% increase in banking claims induces 
a 2 to 3% increase in trade. Finally, we investigate the question of the remaining impact of 
distance. We find out that the impact of distance on trade in goods is only slightly reduced, 
while for asset holdings, a large part of the effect of distance is going through trade. 
 
 






Nous explorons la complémentarité entre commerce de biens et détentions internationales 
d'actifs financiers. Dans un système d'équations de gravité simultanées, nous montrons que le 
commerce de biens accroît les échanges financiers (et vice-versa) et que ces effets sont de 
premier ordre. Une hausse de 10% du commerce bilatéral accroît les échanges financiers 
bilatéraux de 6-7%. Réciproquement, une hausse de 10% des échanges financiers induit une 
hausse du commerce de 2-3%. 
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Abstract
Gravity models have been widely used to describe bilateral trade in goods. Recently, Portes and
Rey [1999] applied this framework to cross border equity °ows and found that distance, which proxies
information asymmetries in ¯nancial markets, is a surprisingly very large barrier to cross-border asset
trade. We adopt here a di®erent point of view and explore the complementarity between bilateral
trade in goods and bilateral asset holdings. We jointly study trade in goods and banking assets in a
simultaneous gravity equations framework using di®erent instruments for both endogenous variables.
To instrument trade in goods, we choose geographical variables (excluding distance) and data on
bilateral transport costs. For asset holdings, we use legal similarities between countries and data on
the international taxation of withheld capital. We ¯nd that the strong correlation between bilateral
trade in goods and asset holdings is not simply due to distance: bilateral trade in goods generates
bilateral asset holdings and vice versa. Those e®ects are of ¯rst order magnitude: a 10% increase in
trade generates a 6 to 7% increase of asset holdings, and a 10% increase in banking claims induces a
2 to 3% increase in trade. Finally, we investigate the question of the remaining impact of distance.
We ¯nd out that the impact of distance on trade in goods is only slightly reduced, while for asset
holdings, a large part of the e®ect of distance is going through trade.
Keywords: gravity models, international ¯nance, international trade, simultaneous equations.
Jel Classi¯cation: F36, F10, C31.
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11 Introduction
The determinants of international asset holdings have recently received renewed attention. Existing
theories are mostly based on portfolio choice models and put forward risk-sharing as the main motive for
cross-border asset trade. However, this literature has been empirically extremely disappointing. Indeed,
Capital Asset Pricing Models predictions do not ¯t data on international portfolios for two main reasons.
First, those models were unable to replicate the size of the \home bias" in country portfolios. If twenty
years ago the segmentation of ¯nancial markets could well explain the \home bias puzzle", it is not likely
to be the case today. Second, countries seem to invest much more in geographically close economies.
Portes and Rey [1999] highlight the very large impact of geography on cross-border equity °ows: when
the physical distance is doubled, capital °ows are at least divided by two. To explain this surprising result,
they argue that informational asymmetries lead to higher transaction costs between distant economies.
Moreover, as they point out, since distant economies should be a better hedge for regional risk, this
result is hard to justify in a world where investors want to diversify their risk. Those results suggest that
barriers to international investment are still large, which is at odds with the popular view of intense and
widespread ¯nancial globalization.
This puzzling e®ect of distance on capital °ows leads to the following question: does distance directly
a®ect international ¯nancial investment or does the negative impact of distance go through another
feature of globalization? In this paper, we argue that distance a®ects bilateral asset holdings mainly
through its impact on trade in goods. The argument is the following: assume that trade in goods is
a powerful determinant of asset portfolios. In that case, since distance, understood as transport costs,
reduces international trade in goods, it is likely to also reduce bilateral asset holdings. Indeed, we show
that the \distance puzzle" documented by Portes and Rey is drastically reduced once we control for trade
in goods. We ¯nd that the distance e®ect on asset holdings is at least divided by two. The remaining
challenge is to explain why asset portfolios are induced by trade in goods.
Thus the second motivation of this paper is to analyze the complementarity between bilateral trade in
goods and bilateral ¯nancial claims. Indeed, there are good reasons to think that trade in goods and trade
in assets are closely related
1. First, due to information asymmetries, entrepreneurs may learn about each
other by trading goods and this information facilitates trade in ¯nancial assets (and vice versa). Second, in
the complete markets model developed by Obstfeld and Rogo® [2000], trade costs (transportation costs or
other barriers to international trade) induce a bias in investors portfolios towards domestic securities and
securities of their trading partners. As a consequence, country portfolios would re°ect trade patterns.
Lane and Milesi{Feretti [2003] test this model in a N{countries set{up and ¯nd the expected e®ects.
However, the argument can easily be reversed: it may be that transaction costs in ¯nancial markets
(pure transaction costs or informational costs) make agents exchange goods with countries with whom
1Obstfeld and Rogo® [2000], Rose [2000], Rose and Spiegel [2002] and Serrat [2001] provide theoretical arguments for
such a complementarity between trade in goods and asset holdings.
2they can easily exchange securities. As a consequence, international investment patterns would impact
trade °ows.
Are those relations between trade and ¯nance of ¯rst{order magnitude: in other words, can we
still model international trade and international investment separately ? We investigate this question
empirically and the answer is an unambiguous no: we ¯nd a very robust and signi¯cant e®ect of trade
on ¯nancial asset holdings. Moreover, the causality runs signi¯cantly in both ways although the impact
of asset holdings on trade in goods is smaller.
In line with Portes and Rey [1999], we consider the \home bias" as given and focus on the determinants
of geographical asset holdings using a \gravity equation" set-up
2. We use a dataset
3 which breaks down
international banking assets by countries
4. We ¯nd that informational frictions decrease bilateral ¯nancial
claims, institutional and cultural proximity a®ect positively international asset holdings and standard
¯nancial motives have marginal e®ects. Those results are consistent with the ¯ndings of Portes and
Rey. However, we also show that bilateral trade patterns are a very strong determinant of bilateral asset
holdings.
In order to address the issue of reverse causality (between bilateral trade and bilateral asset holdings),
the use of good instruments is crucial. We use some geographical variables (excluding distance
5) and
data on bilateral transport costs to instrument bilateral trade in goods. Another set of instruments
for bilateral ¯nancial asset holdings is required: using data on bilateral tax treaties (¯scal taxation of
foreign capital and bilateral agreements on double{taxation) and some institutional proximity variables,
we provide reasonable instruments which allow us to properly address the reverse causality issue. We
estimate that a 10% increase in bilateral trade induces a 6 to 7% increase in bilateral ¯nancial assets
holdings so that the e®ect of trade in goods on asset portfolios is quantitatively important. Conversely, a
10% increase in bilateral ¯nancial asset holdings induces a 2,5% increase in bilateral trade. This empirical
methodology also allows us to identify the channel through which some variables a®ect bilateral trade
(resp. bilateral holdings of ¯nancial assets): as mentioned before, we ¯nd that distance a®ects country
portfolios mainly through its impact on trade. This suggests that globalization has gone much further
on the ¯nancial side than on the real side. Finally, as a by-product, we ¯nd some interesting results on
the \distance puzzle"
6 in the gravity equation of international trade: depending on the methodology, we
reduce the impact of distance on trade in goods by around 20 percents. In order to test the robustness
of our ¯ndings, we reestimated our gravity models using the same empirical methodology but with a
di®erent dataset (the \Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey") which breaks down securities holdings
2\Gravity models" in which bilateral trade °ows are explained by the size of the two partners and the distance between
them, have been used since the 1960s and have provided a powerful predictor of bilateral trade °ows.
3The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) consolidated International Banking Statistics.
4We use stock data whereas Portes and Rey use equity °ow data.
5Since distance is likely to a®ect both endogenous variables
6What we call the \distance puzzle"is the fact that the negative impact of distance on bilateral trade is very large relative
to transport costs (see Grossmann [1998]).
3by countries
7. All our results are con¯rmed qualitatively and quantitatively.
In section 2, we give some insights on the standard gravity models in international trade in goods
and international asset portfolios : although it is not the main point of the paper, we reestimate the
standard \gravity equations" for comparison purposes. In section 3, we properly address the question of
the complementarity between international ¯nancial asset holdings and trade °ows and give the estimates
for the system of two simultaneous gravity equations. We analyze our main results and comment on the
\correlation puzzle" that emerges from the empirics: we ¯nd that, even after controlling for trade and
distance, investors still hold more ¯nancial assets from countries whose returns are positively correlated
with their domestic stock market
8. We also discuss the links between our empirical results and the
existing theory on the complementarity between trade in goods and trade in assets. In section 4, we
conclude.
2 Gravity Models and the Distance Puzzle
The \gravity equation" has been extensively used in the international trade literature from both a theo-
retical and an empirical point of view. The idea is very simple: import °ows from country j to country
i (Importij) are explained by countries sizes (Gdp) and bilateral physical distance (Distij). This simple
rule leads to the following regression (where ¸ and ¹ should be close to one):
log(Importij) = ® + ¸log(Gdpi) + ¹log(Gdpj) ¡ ¯ log(Distij) + "ij
Portes and Rey [1999] apply this rule to asset trade and show that bilateral cross-border equity °ows
can also be described by market size and physical distance. From now on, a \gravity equation" refers to
this type of rule.
2.1 Gravity Models for International Trade in Goods
There is a huge literature on international trade based on a \gravity equation" framework. We ¯rst brie°y
give the theoretical underpinnings that will motivate our empirical speci¯cations.
2.1.1 Theoretical Background
We assume an exogenous number of varieties ni produced in each country i (1 · i · N). A representative
consumer in country i maximises its utility which depends on the °ow of consumption cijh of all varieties
h produced in country j (the elasticity of substitution across goods is assumed to be constant equal to























7This dataset is quite di®erent from the Bis dataset as it includes a larger part of securities and excludes cross-border
bank lending.
8This surprising e®ect of the correlation also appeared in Portes and Rey [1999].
4A good imported from country j is bought by an agent in country i at price pij = (1 + ¿ij)pj where
¿ij is an iceberg-cost that features trade costs on international goods markets
9.
The budget constraint of agent i is then:
PN
j=1(1 + ¿ij)pjnjcij = Yi = PiCi (where Yi denotes the
aggregate revenues of agent i and Pi =
hPN






is the aggregate price index in
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Taking logs-:
log(Importij) = log(Yi) + log(nj) + (¾ ¡ 1)log(Pi) + (1 ¡ ¾)log(pj) + (1 ¡ ¾)log(1 + ¿ij)
Once we suppose that trade costs are positively related with physical distance (Distij) and some other
control variables Z
T
ij, we easily deduce the standard \gravity equation" model:





Previous works on \gravity equation" have shown some relevant determinants of trade costs: Frankel
et al. [1995] and Frankel and Rose [2002] show that Trade Agreements and Currency Unions boost trade.
Rauch [1999,2001] puts forward the informational content of international trade costs. In other words,
trade between people who know each other is less costly and as a consequence people who belong to
the same social networks trade more. For example, countries which share a common language or had
colonial links should trade more: the data con¯rm his argument. Combes et al. [2004] also provide some
insights about the informational content of trade costs using French data. Anderson and Marcouiller
[1999] show the importance of the contractual environment and ¯nd that \trade is reduced in response to
hidden transaction costs associated with the insecurity of international exchange and a lack of contract
enforcement".
2.1.2 Estimation strategies
Following our theoretical model, we propose three estimation strategies:
² Speci¯cation (1)












9Where ¿ii is assumed to be zero.
5We decide to normalize bilateral imports by the product of countries Gdps instead of putting market sizes
as explanatory variables as it is usually done: this avoid eventual misspeci¯cation due to the endogeneity
of Gdps
10; however none of the following results depend on this choice.
This speci¯cation has the main advantage to keep variability in the three dimensions (country i,
country j and bilateral dimension). However, as underlined by Anderson and Van Wincoop [2003], trade
costs do matter for consumption prices Pi which might a®ect the estimated coe±cient on trade cost
variables.
² Speci¯cation (2)











This is our preferred estimation since the number of parameters to estimate is reasonable according to the
size of our dataset and allows us to control for trade costs appearing in the price index of the importer.
² Speci¯cation (3)











This estimation is fully consistent with the theoretical model and control for \multilateral resistance




The \gravity equation" has been extensively estimated with di®erent sets of regressors; however the
coe±cient on physical distance is systematically very high (¯ between 0:8 and 1:2 in many regressions):
therefore, everything else equal, trade drops sharply with distance (a 10% increase in distance reduces
trade by 8%). This estimate is huge compared to what transport costs would suggest (see Grossman
[1998] or Anderson et al. [2003]) and has not decreased over time (although transportation costs have
diminished). One can argue that the \gravity model" might be misspeci¯ed: an omitted variable (cor-
related with physical distance) might lead to an overestimation of ¯ but the di±culty consists in ¯nding
the missing variable. The right one has not been found yet. Empirical works based on network e®ects
(Rauch [1999,2001]) or informational asymmetries (Portes and Rey [1999])
12 help to solve the \Distance
Puzzle" but ¯ remains very high.
10This is equivalent to an estimation where the elasticity of bilateral imports with respect to market sizes are constrained
to one. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
11Indeed, the number of importers is restricted by our dataset on ¯nancial assets, so that our ¯xed-e®ects ®j are estimated
over at most 19 points.
12Portes and Rey reduce signi¯cantly the puzzle for a sample of industrialized countries: their estimate of ¯ ranges from
0:3 to 0:55.
62.2 Gravity Models for International Financial Claims
The adaptation of the \gravity equation" framework to describe international trade in assets is much more
recent. The seminal paper is Portes and Rey [1999]
13 which shows that a \gravity equation" explains
cross-border equity transactions at least as well as trade in goods transactions. They ¯nd that physical
distance is also strongly negatively correlated with asset trade °ows and argue that distance is a proxy for
some informational costs. Using some proxies for information °ows (telephone tra±c between countries,
newspaper circulation, bank branches), they con¯rm that informational °ows enhance signi¯cantly asset
trade. Although those information variables reduce the coe±cient on distance, the latter remains high
and very signi¯cant
14: ¯ is around 0:7 in most speci¯cations which makes the \distance puzzle" even
worse than for trade in goods. As underlined by Portes and Rey, ¯nancial assets are \weightless" and
are not subject to transportation costs. Moreover, if investors want to diversify their risk, they should
bias their portfolio towards distant countries assets as returns in those countries should be less correlated
with domestic returns.
Some other papers use the \gravity equation" framework to describe bilateral foreign direct investment
(Buch [2003], Mody et al. [2002,2003]): such a model accounts well for bilateral Fdi °ows. However, we
think that the determinants of bilateral Fdi °ows are quite di®erent from those of portfolio and debt
°ows. Especially, we should be very cautious with the impact of distance on Fdi °ows as Fdi can be
seen as a substitute of trade °ows.
2.2.1 Theoretical Background
From a theoretical standpoint, Martin and Rey [2000] propose a model where a \gravity equation" of
international trade in assets emerges. In their set-up, international trade in assets and international stock
holdings coincide. We think that it is more natural to theoretically derive a \gravity equation" of stock
holdings and the transposition to asset °ows is not obvious. However, as underlined by Portes and Rey,
when data on bilateral stocks and °ows exist, it is easy to check that they are highly correlated.
We simpli¯y Martin and Rey [2000] modelling by assuming an exogenous number of projects in each
country
15. Each country i (0 · i · N) is populated with ni risk averse agents. In the ¯rst period, agent
h in country i (denoted hi) is endowed with yi units of traded goods (the numeraire) and a risky project.
She consumes part of her endowment, sell shares of her project and buy shares of other agents projects
in the ¯rst period. The number of shares for each project is normalized to one. Agents in country i pay
pj(1 + ¿ij) for a share of a project run in country j (¿ij is an iceberg cost that features the frictions on
international ¯nancial markets)
16.
13Buch[2002] and Papaionnaou [2004] test a Gravity Model for Bilateral Banking Flows and Lane and Milesi-Feretti [2003]
for Bilateral Equity Holdings.
14¯ is decreasing from 0:88 to 0:67.
15which equals the number of agents-investors.
16We assume: ¿ii = 0. As shown by Martin and Rey, we also could apply the cost of holding foreign securities on the
dividend stream without a®ecting the results as long as frictions are iceberg-type.
7There are L equally likely states of nature in the second period. One project in country i run by
agent h pays ±mhidhi = ±mhidi in state m ² f1;::::;Lg where ±mhi = 1 if hi = m and zero otherwise. This
stochastic environment makes assets imperfect substitutes and will create a demand for other agents'
assets in order to diversify their risks.
The total number of projects is M =
PN
j=1 nj. We assume M < L, so that markets are incomplete.
Agent h in country i maximises the following two-period utility subject to a budget constraint (where
x
hi
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Introducing the gross return (Rj) on assets in country j: Rj =
dj
pj, this naturally leads to the following
\gravity equation":
log(Assetij) = log(ninj) ¡ ¾ log(1 + ¿ij) + (¾ ¡ 1)log(Rj) + log(·) + "
A
ij
The ¯rst-term re°ect market sizes of both countries, the second term is related to trading costs in
¯nancial markets and the third term is a \return chasing" component.
Of course, the main question remains to exhibit determinants of transaction costs (¿ij) on ¯nancial
markets (pure transaction costs, taxes on the repatriation of dividends, informational costs, foreign-
exchange costs...). Like Portes and Rey [1999], we use bilateral distance and other proxies for those
bilateral frictions:










Following our estimation strategy for international trade in goods, we propose three identi¯cation strate-
gies:
² Speci¯cation (1)
We proxy market size ni (i.e the number of projects in country i) by the Gdp of country i (Gdpi)








= ® ¡ ¯ log(Distij) + °AZ
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We control for country i ¯xed-e®ects: indeed, in the model the number of investors is equal to the
number of projects but it is likely that some discrepancy exist between those two terms such that Gdpi







= ®i ¡ ¯ log(Distij) + °AZ
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Our dataset concerns the year 2001
20.
In order to estimate a \gravity equation" of international trade, we use data on bilateral trade °ows
from the dataset Chelem (Cepii, Paris). The dependent variable (log(Importij)) is the log of imports
from country j to country i. Because of sample restrictions in our dataset of country ¯nancial assets,
we restrict our dataset on trade °ows to 19 importers countries (i) and 62 exporters countries (j)
21.
Using worldwide data, trade °ows are usually found to be zero for an important number of country pairs,
which makes interesting to consider ¯xed cost in international trade in addition to marginal e®ects of
iceberg-type costs; however, because of our sample restrictions in our data on ¯nancial assets, we are
considering only imports towards relatively rich countries and we do not have zeroes in our dataset. As
18Like for bilateral imports, we normalize our asset holdings by the product of market sizes. However our results do no
not depend on this normalization choice.
19Financial wealth of country i would be a better proxy but it is unfortunately non-observable.
20Although using panel data would be more appropriate, we are restricted by our dataset on international ¯nancial claims.
Testing the robustness of our result using panel data is left for future work.
21For a country list, see Appendix.
9a consequence, we are not able to model the e®ect of ¯xed cost on international trade and restrict our
attention on the intensive margin of trade due to iceberg-type trade costs.
For the \gravity equation" of bilateral international asset holdings, we use data on bilateral banking
¯nancial assets in 2001: the Bank of International Settlements issues quarterly the international claims
of its reporting banks on individual countries, geographically broken down by nationality of reporting
banks
22. The dependant variable (log(Assetij)) is the log of ¯nancial claims in country (j) of banks of
country (i) (expressed in US dollars). It might be surprising to use data on the banking sector to estimate
our \gravity model". However we can justify our choice with three main arguments: ¯rst, the reliability of
the dataset since it is often a very di±cult task to collect data on stocks; second, banking ¯nancial assets
do not include Foreign Direct Investment and as we said before there are good reasons to think that Fdi
does not obey the same determinant as a standard geographical portfolio
23; ¯nally, to explain portfolio
°ows, we have to consider borrowing and lending since it is the main part of international investment
(see Kraay et al. [2000])
24. The main drawback of our dataset is that we cannot distinguish di®erent
types of assets (especially between equities, bonds and cross-border bank lending): indeed, it could be
that informational costs di®er for di®erent types of assets (see Portes et al. [2001])
25. In the appendix,
table A.2 gives some insights on the nature of international banking assets: a disaggregation by sector
shows that banking assets are for half interbank assets, the rest being corporate sector ¯nancing (35%)
and public sector ¯nancing (15%). A disaggregation by types of assets show that a big part is loan
and deposit (around two thirds) but a non-negligible part consist in negotiable securities (bonds and
equities
26). Unfortunately such a disaggregation is not available in the bilateral dimension.
We use \importer" and \exporter" countries' Gdps (Gdpi and Gdpj) to correct for markets sizes
27.
The product of Gdps will be used to normalize our dependent variables
28.
The distance between the two main cities is used for bilateral distance (Distij)
29. In the Gravity
Model of Trade in Goods, we add other geographical variables: Borderij, which is unity if country i and
j have a common border and zero otherwise, Islandsij which is the number of islands in the country pair,
AreaiAreaj, the (log of the) product of the countries' areas, and LandLockij the number of landlocked
countries in the country pair.
22See http://www.bis.org/statistics/histstats10.htm. To get more robust results, we average quarterly data for portfolio
stocks in 2001. We do not exploit the time series aspect of this dataset because there is too much variations in the reporting
conventions. In particular the dataset was initially built to monitor risks due to emerging economies and the claims held
on developed countries are only reported since 1999, which makes a rather short time span for a stocks dataset.
23Moreover, banking assets include a marginal part of trade credit (as it is mainly inter-¯rm ¯nance) which avoid any
spurious relationship between asset holdings and goods trade. For France, we have a disaggregation of foreign banking
assets by types of assets: the share of trade credit is 0:05% of total foreign banking assets.
24Especially in developing countries where bond and equity markets are underdeveloped, see table A.2.
25However, we have for some countries (namely France and Uk) a certain level of disaggregation between bonds & equities
and cross-border lending. Geographical allocation of di®erent types of assets have very similar patterns.
26For some countries, namely France and Uk, we know that around half of total securities are equities.
27Some might argue that market capitalization could be a better proxy for the Gravity Model of Asset Trade but no one
of our results were a®ected by this choice. Moreover the choice of Gdps is more consistent with theoretical foundations.
28We ¯rst added Gdp/Capita in the Asset Trade Regression to control for the development of ¯nancial markets but the
results were mixed because of interaction with our corruption variable. However, no one of our results depend on this
speci¯cation.
29We ¯rst added a \Time Di®erence" variable to control for di®erent working hours of stock markets but we dropped it
because it did not modify any of the results.
10We construct Trade Zone dummies when both countries belong to a Trade agreement in 2001. We
have three dummy variables: Naftaij for the Nafta Agreement, Ecij for the European Community
and Apecij for the Asia-Paci¯c Economic Cooperation. We do not consider currency unions because the
Euro Zone is the only one in our dataset and the e®ect is already captured by the European Community
dummy.
To take into account the informational determinants of trade in goods and assets, we use a \Common
Language" dummy (Languageij) if country i and country j share the same language and a \Colonial
Link" dummy (ColonialDepij) if country j has been a colony of country i (or vice versa).
Following Anderson et al. [1999] and Papaioannou [2004]
30, we use an index of corruption for the
\importer" and the \exporter" countries (Corruptioni and Corruptionj) since it is likely that hidden bribes
reduce transactions in international markets. This index is developed by Transparency International
31
and gives some insights on the degree of corruption as seen by business people, academics and risk
analysts.
We also add some ¯scal and legal determinants of transaction costs in ¯nancial markets:
² First, we use a dummy for the proximity of legal systems from La Porta et al. [1997,1998]. We
distinguish between \common law" systems (or \English law"), \French law", \German law" and
\Swedish law". The dummy variable Legalij equals one when source and destination countries have
the same legal system. Indeed, legal system similarities might also reduce information asymmetries
and contracting costs.
² Second, we use bilateral tax treaties
32 to describe the taxation of foreign capital. Although most
of the countries we study have a residence{based tax system, they charge withholding taxes when
foreigners repatriate dividends, capital gains or interests. To limit double{taxation, several bilateral
tax treaties regulate those withholding taxes. We built two di®erent variables that describe bilateral
tax on dividends (and capital gains) and on interests (from loans, deposits or debt securities), resp.
DividendTaxij and InterestTaxij, in percents. Both of them should a®ect banking assets
33. When
such tax treaty does not exist, we use the regulatory tax rate applied to foreigners.
² Third, we suppose that countries that have old ¯scal agreements should exchange more in ¯nancial
markets for historical reasons. We add the age of the ¯scal treaty (if there is one, zero otherwise) to
catch this e®ect (FiscalTreatyij). We also add a variable TaxHavenj to control for capital recipient
countries with very favourable ¯scal treatment. We consider three Tax Havens in our sample,
namely Switzerland, Luxembourg and Panama.
30Papaionnou [2004] ¯nds a large impact of institutional quality on cross-border bank °ows.
31http://www.transparency.org, \Corruption Perception Index"
32http://www.ibfd.org
33Those taxes are far from being negligible, ranging from 0% for some agreements to 40%, and as we mentioned before,
equity shares are a non{negligible part of banking assets.
11Finally, we use stock market data (monthly stock prices in US $ from 1990 to 2001 of the main stock
market index of the country
34) to compute the log of the average gross stock returns of country j (Retj)
and the empirical correlation over the period between the stock returns of the country pair (Correlationij).
If we assume that diversi¯cation motives matter for asset allocations, we might expect that countries
would hold a higher share of assets with respect to countries whose assets are poor substitutes of the
domestic ones (i.e whose stock returns are weakly correlated with domestic returns).




























































































































































N. Obs. 977 977 977 977 977 977 977 977
R
2
0:426 0:446 0:465 0:497 0:511 0:543 0:704 0:728
Table 1: Gravity Models for Bilateral Imports.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Statistical signi¯cance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp. ** and ***).
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34Most data on stock returns are from Martin and Rey [2002].
12Depending on the speci¯cation used, we estimate the following regressions where Z
kT

































Our estimates of the usual \gravity models" of trade are shown in table 1. They support the consensus
view of a strong and signi¯cant impact of physical distance on trade in goods; ¯ is estimated between
0:7 and 0:8 depending on the speci¯cation: this ¯gure is in line with previous studies and as we already
mentioned surprisingly high. Adding \Language", \Colonial Link" and \Trade Zone" dummies does not
solve the \distance puzzle" although those variables are signi¯cant
36.
2.3.3 Estimation of a Gravity Model for Trade in Assets
We estimate the following regression where Z
kA
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Our estimation of the standard \gravity equation" is presented in table 2.
As in Portes and Rey, we ¯nd a strong negative impact of physical distance on asset trade; ¯ is
estimated between 0:4 and 0:7 depending on the speci¯cation
37 and the \distance puzzle" is worse
than for trade °ows. Adding \Language", \Colonial Link" and \Legal System" dummies as proxies for
information °ows helps to solve the puzzle (in our most complete speci¯cation, ¯ is equal to 0:45) but ¯
remains very high and signi¯cant. We con¯rm here the importance of information as our three variables
boost signi¯cantly international asset holdings (more than goods trade) and help to reduce the impact
of distance.
Our ¯scal variables are signi¯cant with the expected contribution
38: the e®ects of ¯scality are statis-
tically signi¯cant and strong. Indeed, a 10 percentage points increase of bilateral dividend withholding
tax leads to a 20% decrease in bilateral banking claims.
As expected, our measure of returns a®ects positively portfolio shares
39 and corruption reduces sig-
ni¯cantly asset holdings (probably by reducing returns or by increasing risks).
35Z1T
ij includes both importers and exporters ¯xed factors that might a®ect international trade in goods, whereas we drop
importers ¯xed factors in the set Z2T
ij and both importers and exporters ¯xed factors in the set Z3T
ij to keep only dyadic
variables.
36Surprisingly, trade zone dummies are not very robust, the APEC e®ect being the only robust (and positive) e®ect; ¯ is
consistently estimated around 0:7 ¡ 0:8.
37For comparison, in Portes and Rey, ¯ is around 0:6 in most speci¯cations.
38The age of the ¯scal treaty is the less robust one.
39According to the theoretical model, this means that the asset demand elasticity with respect to asset prices ¾ is greater
than one. Throughout the paper, our estimates suggest a ¾ between 2 and 3, depending on the speci¯cation.
13The \Correlation Puzzle"
More surprisingly, even when we control for distance and informational variables
40, we ¯nd that a
country will hold more ¯nancial assets from a country whose stock market is highly correlated with his
own one. This e®ect is quite large, very signi¯cant and absolutely at odds with the ¯nance literature
predictions. Portes and Rey [1999] also found that diversi¯cation motives do not play a large role in
explaining asset trade beween industrialized countries and we con¯rm their results using a larger sample
of countries

















































































































































N. Obs. 977 977 977 977 977 977 977 977
R
2 0:209 0:408 0:416 0:373 0:536 0:553 0:648 0:702
Table 2: Gravity Models for Bilateral Banking Claims.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Statistical signi¯cance at the 10% (resp. 5% and 1%) level are denoted by * (resp. ** and ***).
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40We also tried to control for Gdp/Capita to be sure that this result was not just catching the fact that rich countries
have higher correlations and higher trading volumes.
41Everything else equal, diversi¯cation should be a larger motive for asset trade once we include emerging countries since
they provide larger diversi¯cation opportunities.
143 Asset Portfolios and Trade in Goods Complementarity ?
3.1 A misspeci¯ed regression ?
Our previous results and especially the strong impact of distance let us think that both \gravity equations"
might be misspeci¯ed. The idea is very simple: let us suppose that for any reason trade in goods
enhances asset trade (and vice versa). Then, omitting bilateral trade in goods in the \gravity equation"
for international asset holdings is likely to lead to a bias in the estimates of some coe±cients. Especially,
we might expect that the coe±cient ¯ on distance in the \Asset Regression" is biased upwards as distance
a®ects negatively bilateral trade in goods. Put di®erently, part of the e®ect of distance on international
banking portfolios might go through trade. On the other hand, in the \gravity model" for trade in goods,
there is no reason to exclude bilateral banking claims.






































In other words, if trade in goods and asset holdings are complementary, estimating independently the
previous gravity models is not appropriate. The Ols estimator of the gravity models including ¯nancial
asset holdings in the \trade in goods model" (resp. trade in the \¯nancial assets model") con¯rms
this intuition (see table 3, ¯rst column): trade seems to a®ect positively geographical portfolios (and
respectively countries that have bilateral ¯nancial relationships trade more). These are ¯rst{order e®ects
since for example, a 10% increase in bilateral trade leads to a 3% increase in bilateral banking claims.
We get that a large part of the impact of physical distance on bilateral asset holdings goes through its
impact on trade. On the other hand, its impact on trade in goods is a bit smaller.
Of course the variables we consider in those estimations are jointly determined and the estimation
may su®er from an endogeneity bias. Especially, if both types of trade are reinforcing each other, we
15expect a downward bias on the Ols estimates, which will be con¯rmed. Still, what we show here is that
we should take into account the complementarity of asset holdings and trade in goods in our gravity
modelling.
3.2 Theoretical Motivation
From a theoretical point of view, the channel through which bilateral trade a®ects country portfolios is
not clear. We propose to give some insights on the theoretical explanation. Obstfeld and Rogo® [2000]
and Spiegel and Rose [2002] provide two di®erent channels through which barriers to international trade
in goods would reduce bilateral asset holdings
42.
Obstfeld and Rogo® [2000]: \The Consumption Hedging Story"
Obstfeld and Rogo® [2000] argue that adding trade costs into a complete markets model with two
countries (where agents can insure their consumption basket with Arrow{Debreu Securities) helps to
explain the \home bias" puzzle. In their model, trade costs imply a bias towards domestic securities since
trade costs reduce investors incentives to repatriate their dividends from foreign assets. They provide their
model to solve the \home bias puzzle"
43. However, a simple extension with many countries (and bilateral
trade costs) would lead to a bias towards securities of trading partners (relative to other countries). Lane
and Milesi{Feretti [2003] provide a N{country generalization of Obstfeld and Rogo®'s model. In their
model, trade in goods enhances asset portfolios as equity biases re°ect in large measure goods market
biases.
Rose and Spiegel [2002]: \The Sovereign Risk Story"
Rose and Spiegel [2002] propose a model of international lending where bilateral lending is sustainable
because of bilateral trade in goods. Their paper is in line with the \sovereign debt" literature (for a survey,
see Eaton and Fernandez [1995]). Because debt contract cannot be enforced internationally, creditors
lend to foreign countries only when they can threaten the debtor with a credible sanction in case of
default
44. In their model, penalties go through trade: creditors exclude their defaulting partners from
trade relationship (cutting trade credits for example). In a sense, trade is a collateral which relaxes partly
borrowing constraints. As a consequence, bilateral trade a®ects bilateral lending
45.
Possible common frictions on goods and ¯nancial markets?
We could also argue that some costs on international markets a®ect simultaneously bilateral trade
in goods and bilateral asset holdings. In line with Portes and Rey [1999], a simple story could be
42We are aware that there is an extensive literature on Fdi that shows that it might be either complementary to or
substitute for Trade but we do not want to go much into it as we consider Fdi as a very di®erent type of asset (for a survey
see Venables [1999,2000]).
43In a dynamic set-up, Serrat [2001] also provides theoretical evidence that frictions in goods market lead to home bias
in portfolios: frictions are captured by the existence of non-traded goods but this delivers the same kind of predictions for
portfolios.
44In those models, the maximum sustainable lending is exactly the sanction value.
45The reverse causality is not considered.
16based on information asymmetries: because trading partners share information, the information °ows
through trade will enhance asset stocks (and vice versa). In other words, because information °ows
(or social networks) positively a®ect both cross{border ¯nance and trade, trade in goods and trade
in assets become in a sense complementary: ¯rm managers learn about each other by trading goods
and/or securities. Therefore, trading in the goods market reduces informational asymmetries in the
¯nancial markets (and vice versa). We have plenty of anecdotal evidence where an exporting ¯rm brings
its ¯nancial intermediary to help ¯nancing an investment plan of a potential client. We guess that the
¯nancial intermediary can propose better credit terms because it can get private information from its
exporting client. As a consequence trade in goods enhances corporate ¯nancing. The apparent gravity
structure of asset trade would therefore rely mainly on information °ows induced by trade in goods.
A competing story based on transaction costs on the cross{country foreign exchange markets could
also potentially justify this complementarity between asset holdings and trade in goods. Indeed, the larger
the volume of trade between two countries, the more liquid and e±cient are foreign exchange markets and
consequently the more attractive the ¯nancial transactions between the two. The appealing part of such
an assumption is that it also explains the reverse causality. Frankel and Rose [2002] reveal a surprisingly
large e®ect of currency unions on trade
46, which is consistent with our assumption since a common
currency reduces transaction costs on both markets. Thus, the increase in bilateral trade in goods is
reinforced by an increase in bilateral asset holdings (and vice-versa), leading to a kind of \accelerator
e®ect". One would argue that transaction costs are rather small especially between developed countries
47:
however if those costs are negatively related to the volume of transactions, it is not surprising that those
costs are small between countries that trade a lot in international markets.
But whatever the story, we need to con¯rm our empirical result and especially address the endogeneity
problem to provide a precise quanti¯cation of those e®ects.
3.3 Instrumental Variables Estimation
3.3.1 Estimation strategy
To con¯rm the strength of the reciprocal e®ect of bilateral trade in goods on bilateral asset holdings, we
need to correct for endogeneity.
The empirical model we have to estimate is now the following simultaneous equations system where
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46We are not able replicate those results because of sample limitation.
47Transaction costs with developing countries are di±cult to estimate.
48Under speci¯cation (1).
17Two di®erent empirical questions arise from this estimation:
² ¯rst, what is the e®ect of trade in goods on international banking claims (and vice versa)? In other
words, what are the elasticities ÁA and ÁT?
² second, once we have taken into account the endogeneity of trade in goods and international banking
assets, what is the independent e®ect of the geographical distance on international asset portfolios
and international trade in goods (i.e what are the values of ¯A and ¯T)?
We will consider those two questions separately.
3.3.2 What are the e®ect of trade in goods on international banking claims (and vice
versa)?
Instrumentation methodology
In order to estimate the impact of trade in goods on international asset holdings (and vice versa),
we have to provide instruments for both dependent variables. We do not need completely di®erent
instruments but at least a set of instruments that a®ect both di®erently (or better: instruments that
a®ect only one of our endogenous variables). Indeed, the estimates of ÁA and ÁT should not depend on
the instruments used as long as they are valid instruments.
To instrument trade in goods, we could use distance and some other geographical variables that are
known to matter for bilateral trade in goods. However, since we do not know a priori if distance matters for
international portfolio allocation, we are exposed to multicollinearity issues in the second stage regression
for asset holdings (remind that distance is a very powerful determinant of trade in goods). We propose
another identi¯cation based on transport costs data: indeed, transport costs certainly a®ect trade in
goods but should not a®ect international asset holdings. Providing data on transport costs is a very
di±cult task
49 but we actually built a dataset on bilateral transport costs, looking at the bilateral cost of
shipping a ton between the two main cities of the country pair using Ups services
50. We are aware that
this variable is no more than an estimate of transport costs as it is only airline freight (whereas the biggest
part of goods transportation is sea freight or truck freight). However, we argue that this variable is a
good instrument since it is actually a good predictor of goods trade and, which is the most important for
our purpose, should be independent of bilateral asset holdings. We ¯nally restrict our set of instruments
for bilateral trade in goods to some geographical variables (excluding distance) and transport costs data.
We now have to provide variables that a®ect international asset holdings independently of bilateral
trade in goods. We argue that the ¯scal and legal variables will provide reasonable instruments for
international banking claims (i.e LegalSystemij, InterestTaxij, DividendTaxij, FiscalTreatyij).
We decide to drop distance from both set of instruments to avoid multicollinearity problems in the
second stage but we will see that this choice has some consequence on the estimated remaining impact
49Hummels [1999] gives estimates of transport costs but unfortunately only from the US point of view.






ij) are the instruments for banking claims (resp. trade in goods), the First-Stage





















ÁA and ÁT are then estimated simply by plugging the predicted value of trade in goods (resp. banking
claims) in the second-stage regression.
Results
In our ¯rst speci¯cation (table 3, Speci¯cation (1), third column)
51, trade in goods is instrumented
by variables that we expect to be independent of banking assets, i.e geographical variables (excluding














LegalSystemij, InterestTaxij, DividendTaxij, FiscalTreatyij
ª
The First-Stage regressions perform reasonably well suggesting that we do not have \weak" instru-
ments problems
53. We provide exclusion tests (Sargan Tests) con¯rming the validity of our instruments:
our instruments for trade in goods are a®ecting asset holdings only through their impact on trade in
goods (and vice versa our instruments for asset holdings are not a®ecting independently trade in goods).
ÁA and ÁT are found to be signi¯cant at standard levels. Trade patterns a®ect strongly international
asset holdings: the estimates of ÁA is remarkably high (around 0:7), which means that a 10% increase in
bilateral trade in goods induces a 7% increase in bilateral asset holdings. Reciprocally, cross-border asset
holdings between two countries a®ect positively their bilateral trade although the e®ect is less strong (ÁT
is estimated to 0:24).
Robustness checks using di®erent sets of instruments
In the previous speci¯cation, we have estimated ÁA and ÁT using instruments that only a®ect one of
the two endogenous variables
54; this speci¯cation is probably the most convincing although it is possible to
use a larger set of instruments and \exogenous" variables that might a®ect both endogenous variables. We
do it as a robustness check. We expand the set of instruments including all our set of exogenous variable
51Estimates of control variables other than distance are not reported but available on request.
52To take into account some non-linearities in the transport costs, we also use its square as an instrument.
53The First{Sls gives an R2 of 0:29 for Tradeij=[GdpiGdpj] and 0:14 for Assetij=[GdpiGdpj]. First{Sls are not
reported but available on request.
54There is no variable that is common instrument for both types of trade.
19except bilateral distance
55 This speci¯cation allows us to catch a larger variablility of asset holdings and
trade in goods in the ¯rst-stage regression
56. The estimates of ÁA and ÁT should not depend on the
set of instruments, which is con¯rmed by our estimates (see table 3, Speci¯cation (1), fourth column).
Our estimated elasticities are roughly identical, highly signi¯cant, which con¯rms the two-way causality
between ¯nancial portfolios and trade in goods.
Robustness checks with country ¯xed-e®ects
Controlling for importer-country ¯xed e®ects almost does not change the estimated value of ÁA and
ÁT
57 (speci¯cation (2)). ÁA is still remarkably high (around 0:6) and ÁT is consistently estimated between
0:2 and 0:3, which is consistent with the previous estimates. Again, expanding the set of instruments
does not change the results (see table (3), Speci¯cation (2), third and fourth column).
Speci¯cation (3) raises some estimations di±culties due to the important number of parameters that
have to be estimated. Indeed, our main instrument for bilateral trade in goods i.e data on bilateral
transport costs is almost fully explained by exporter-country ¯xed e®ects and bilateral distance
58 which
raises multicollinearity issues in the second step. To avoid this problem, we propose to keep country i
and country j ¯xed-e®ect in the trade regression since the country j speci¯c factors that matters for
international trade in goods in the theoretical model are indeed unobservable. In the asset regression
where the multicollinearity problem is the most stringent, we just keep country i ¯xed-e®ect and the
observable variable that is found to matter in the theoretical model (i.e Retj). We also add a full set of
regional dummies for capital recipient countries in order to control as much as possible for unobservable
regional factors of capital importing countries. Again, our estimates con¯rm the previous results (see
Appendix, table A.3).
Robustness checks using Securities Holdings
We propose exactly the same identi¯cation methodology using a di®erent dataset on bilateral portfolio
holdings: this dataset
59 provided by the Imf geographically breaks down securities holdings. It gives
the aggregate bilateral portfolio stocks (including Equities, Long{Term Debt Securities and Short{Term
Debt Securities) in USD for a large sample of countries in 2001; we restrict this dataset to our sample
of importing countries (excluding Taiwan) and exporting countries. Those data include a larger part of
negotiable securities than the Bis database but exclude bank lending.
We redo the same regressions with this new dataset on foreign capital stocks, using exactly the same
simultaneous equation set{up (and the same instrumentation methodology): the results con¯rm our
55We still exclude distance from the set of instruments although including distance gives very comparable estimates. The


















56The First{Sls gives an R2 of 0:35 for Tradeij=[GdpiGdpj] and 0:32 for Assetij=[GdpiGdpj].
57Although ÁA is a bit smaller
58Indeed, 90% of the variance of our transport cost variable is explained by country j ¯xed-e®ects and bilateral distance.
59Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey Data, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm
20Naive Ols System Ols Instrument Set # 1 Instrument Set # 2























































N. Obs. 977 977 977 977 977 977 977 977
R
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N. Obs. 977 977 977 977 977 977 977 977
R
2
0:536 0:543 0:559 0:558 0:553 0:552 0:554 0:553
Table 3: Simultaneous Gravity Models for Bilateral Imports and Bilateral Banking Claims.
Standard errors in parentheses.













































































c P{values in parentheses.
21previous ¯ndings since we get remarkably similar estimates (see Appendix, table A.4). Asset Holdings
and Goods Trade are enhancing each other and the elasticities we have estimated with banking assets
are very stable. Those results with a di®erent dataset show the robustness of our ¯ndings.
3.3.3 What is the independent e®ect of the geographical distance on international asset
portfolios and international trade in goods?
At this point, we are con¯dent that bilateral asset holdings and bilateral trade in goods are reinforcing
each other. We are also reasonably convinced given the di®erent robustness checks that ÁA and ÁT are
fairly well estimated.
We want to raise another issue: how does this misspeci¯cation in the standard gravity equation bias
the estimates of the control variables? Indeed, given the fact that distance might a®ect trade in goods
through transport costs (resp. asset holdings through information costs), we expect the impact of distance
to be reduced once we control for the endogeneity of trade in goods and asset holdings. But how large is
the remaining impact of geographical distance on asset holdings and trade in goods once endogeneity is
controlled for? Especially, we would like to know whether physical distance a®ects international portfolios
on the top of its e®ect through trade in goods. Technically, this is equivalent to give an estimate of ¯A
(resp. ¯T) in the model (¤).
Estimating an upper-bound for the e®ect of distance on asset holdings (resp. on
trade in goods)
60
It is important to consider that looking at the estimates of ¯A (resp. ¯T) in the second-stage regression
once we have instrumented trade in goods (resp. asset holdings) might be misleading. Indeed, the
estimates of ¯A and ¯T are not independent of the instruments used in the ¯rst-stage regression (contrary
to ÁA and ÁT). Assume for instance that trade in goods is instrumented by a variable that is orthogonal
to distance (and to asset holdings): in the Second-Stage regression, ¯A will still be catching the e®ect
of physical distance going through trade in goods (actually ¯A will exactly estimate the global e®ect of
distance on asset holdings whatever its cause).
The instruments we use are not orthogonal to distance but still looking at the estimate of ¯A in the
second-stage regression will just provide an upper-bound for the independent e®ect of distance on asset
holdings (as long as distance is not included in the set of instruments, see appendix for a technical proof).
Intuitively, when we drop distance from the set of instruments, we give it the maximum chance to show
up in the second stage regression
61.
Table (3) gives the estimates of ¯A (resp. ¯T) for the di®erent sets of instruments
62. The independent
e®ect of distance on bilateral asset holdings is at most a reduction of 2% of banking claims when distance
increases by 10%: we reduce dramatically the e®ect of distance on asset portfolios (the magnitude of the
60Technically, this is equivalent to estimate a upper-bound for ¯A (resp. ¯T)
61Adding distance in the set of instruments raises multicollinearity issues in the second stage regression that cast doubt
on our estimate of ¯A and ¯T.
62Under speci¯cations (1) and (2). Spec. (3) is available in Table A.3.
22\distance puzzle" has been reduced by 60%) although such an elasticity is far from being negligible. For
trade in goods, we ¯nd an upper-bound for ¯T that is equal to 0:69. We also provide estimates of the
size of the bias on ¯A (resp. ¯T)
63. Those estimates provide evidence that the e®ect of distance on asset
holdings might be rather small whereas its e®ect on bilateral imports remains quite large. According to
the estimated size of the bias, the \independent" e®ect of distance on asset holdings should be close to
zero whereas its \independent" e®ect on trade °ows is at most reduced by around 20% compared to the
Ols estimates of previous section.
Our robustness checks using country ¯xed-e®ects con¯rms those estimates. Moreover, when we con-
sider securities holdings instead of banking assets, we reproduce very similar estimates (see table (3),
Speci¯cation (2) and Appendix tables (A.3) and (A.4)). Using securities holdings, we ¯nd that the re-
maining e®ect of distance on asset portfolios is slightly higher than for banking claims, indicating that
information costs might be larger for equities and corporate bonds than for bank lending.
In short, we get that an exogenous increase in bilateral trade in goods has a strong impact on asset
portfolios: a 10% leads to a 6 to 7% increase in bilateral asset holdings. This e®ect is robust to many
speci¯cations and to the use of di®erent types of assets (banking assets versus negotiable securities).
The reverse causality is also true but of a smaller magnitude. Once we control for trade costs in goods
markets, the remaining impact of geographical distance on asset holdings is much smaller: the elasticity
of distance with respect to asset holdings is estimated between 0 and 0:2. The distance{e®ect on bilateral
imports has been slightly reduced but remains high and undisputable.
3.4 Back to the \correlation puzzle"
Adding trade in the regression does not solve the \correlation puzzle" we mentioned in the ¯rst section.
Indeed, we could have expected that this \correlation puzzle" was due to a misspeci¯cation of the regres-
sion. Because business cycles are more correlated between trading partners (see Frankel and Rose [1998],
Imbs [1999]), we could have expected that the correlation variable was spuriously catching the e®ect of
trade on cross{border asset holdings. As the \puzzle" remains once we control for trade, this intuition
is not con¯rmed by the data. Indeed, we still ¯nd that portfolios are biased towards countries whose
assets are close substitutes to the domestic ones and the estimated impact of the bilateral correlation on
bilateral asset holdings is close to the previous Ols-estimates
64.
We think that the \correlation puzzle" comes from an estimation bias in the regression. Indeed, stock
market correlation may be endogenous, and adding it roughly in the regression may be inappropriate.
There is very few empirical (and theoretical) work that takes the correlation of returns
65 as endogenous.
However we have good reasons to think that it is the case: with \dynamic portfolio rebalancing", Coeur-
63See technical appendix for the derivations of the bias on ¯A (resp. ¯T).
64The e®ect is slightly lower: the coe±cient is estimated between 0:6 and 1:2 and signi¯cant at standard levels. Estimates
available on request.
65Imbs [1999] is a notable exception even if he does not consider the impact of the correlation on e®ective bilateral °ows.
23dacier and Guibaud [2004] generates endogenous comovements of stock prices between markets and those
comovements are more pronounced when ¯nancial frictions between markets are low. In other words, well
integrated ¯nancial markets should exhibit higher correlation of their stock markets, which enhances the
probability of simultaneously observing high correlations of returns and high levels of cross-border asset
holdings. To correct for this endogeneity bias, one should be able to ¯nd an instrument of the correlation
of stock markets that is exogenous to the degree of integration between ¯nancial markets. Since we are
not able to provide such a valid instrument, we must admit that, at this point, there is no evidence that
diversi¯cation matters for asset allocation and restoring the standard predictions of the portfolio choice

















Figure 2: A way to solve the "Correlation Puzzle".
3.5 Testing competing theories?
We provide convincing empirical results arguing that a reduction of frictions on international goods
markets enhances bilateral asset holdings (and vice versa). One can see our empirical results on the
two{way relationship between asset holdings and trade in goods as a necessity to consider the interaction
between trade and ¯nance in a common theoretical set{up. We do not pretend to submit a full theory
explaining what we observed in the data but we try to give some new empirical results that might be an
helpful guidance for future theoretical works on this issue.
Even if it is di±cult to test properly with our data the di®erent stories we gave in section 3.2, one way
to con¯rm Obstfeld and Rogo® [2000] theory would be based on the di®erent roles played by imports and
exports in their model; indeed, only trade costs on imports matter for bilateral asset stocks: agents want
to hedge their consumption basket and bias their portfolio towards securities of countries from which they
import goods. Then, as long as bilateral imports and bilateral exports are not completely symmetrical
(which is the case)
66, we should expect that import patterns are the main determinant of geographical
portfolio holdings.
We do a regression for bilateral ¯nancial assets including bilateral imports and bilateral exports and,
surprisingly, exports are the main determinant of portfolio holdings (see Appendix, table A.5): of course,
66Trade Costs might not be symmetrical either!
24we should be cautious with this result as we cannot address the endogeneity problem with those two
variables (because we do not have di®erent instruments). However, the results are quite appealing and
reveal that their story might not be the whole story.
Rose and Spiegel [2002] story is very attractive, but it is hard to believe that sovereign risk is a major
concern for industrialized countries. Indeed, we ¯nd that the e®ect of bilateral trade on asset holdings is
even larger for rich countries than for emerging countries (see Appendix, table A.6).
4 Conclusion
We bridge two strands of literature: international trade in goods on the one hand and international asset
portfolios on the other. Numerous papers have shown that international trade in goods can be very well
described by gravity models and some recent papers have pointed out that international asset portfolios
could also be described by this kind of models: if the distance between two countries doubles, bilateral
asset holdings are almost divided by two. This far from negligible impact seems somewhat puzzling, since
geography should not shape asset trade in a globalized world.
Portes and Rey [1999] justi¯es the impact of distance on asset °ows by information costs, distance
acting as a proxy for the informational asymmetries. We chose here to investigate another idea, namely
that trade in goods and asset holdings are mutually reinforcing. The strong impact of distance on asset
holdings is the consequence of the complementarity between trade in goods and trade in assets.
Using bilateral data on international trade °ows and international banking claims, we have examined
what remained of the e®ect of distance once we take into account the fact that trade in goods and bilateral
¯nancial claims are mutually determined. The set of instruments we use to identify the system is a crucial
aspect of this study. We have used geographical variables and new data on transport costs to instrument
trade in goods. To instrument asset holdings, we followed LaPorta et al. [1997,1998] and used data on
legal environments; to the standard legal environment data, we added a set of variables we built, which
describe some aspects of the bilateral ¯scal relationships between countries (bilateral withholding taxes
on dividends and interests, and ¯scal agreements). This methodology allows us to estimate precisely
the e®ect of bilateral trade in goods on bilateral asset holdings: this e®ect is found to be quantitatively
important since a 10% increase in bilateral imports lead to a 6 to 7% increase in bilateral asset holdings.
Bilateral asset holdings also enhance trade in goods but the latter e®ect is found to be much smaller.
Our results show that only trade in goods has an undisputable gravity structure, i.e. a structure in
which distance (understood as a proxy for transportation and transaction costs) is a major determinant.
The system we have estimated shows that distance a®ects asset holdings mainly through its impact on
trade in goods: in the asset part of the system, the magnitude of the distance puzzle is at least reduced
25by 60%.
The existing scenarios (Obstfeld and Rogo®'s consumption hedging, Rose's sovereign risk) cannot be
formally eliminated so far, even if we have shown that some of our results cast doubt on each one of them.
Another story based on common transaction costs on ¯nancial markets and goods markets could be a
more natural match to our result. For example, in line with Portes and Rey's paper, it might be that
both trade in assets and trade in goods are subject to some common information costs making trade in
goods and trade in assets complementary. Those information spillovers (from goods markets to ¯nancial
markets) would need to be very large to have the observed e®ects but we do think that this explanation
is a large part of the story. However, we do not pretend to provide a full-°etched theory of what we point
out in the data. The robustness and the strength of our empirical results shed light on the necessity to
model trade and ¯nancial linkages together. It is a new challenge for the economic theory.
Furthermore, our framework leads to an other puzzle: the higher the correlation between two countries
stock returns, the larger the volume of asset trading between the two. This result still holds true once we
control for trade in goods. This reinforces the need for a theoretical study on the interactions between
trade in goods, trade in assets and diversi¯cation.
Finally, these results raise some interesting questions about the coherence of liberalization policies.
We show in this paper that trade in goods and in assets reinforce each other. Trade policies and capital
account liberalization cannot be considered independently. Therefore, these policies should be thought
of by policymakers in a common and single perspective.
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² Bilateral Exports and Imports: in 2001, in US Dollars from the Chelem dataset (Centres
d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales, Cepii, Paris).
² Bilateral Financial Banking Assets: in US dollars, average over quaterly data in 2001, from
the Bank of International Settlements.
² Bilateral Securities Holdings: in US dollars, in 2001, from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment
Survey, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm
² Gdp and Population: from the International Financial Statistics.(Gdp in US dollars in 2001,
exchange rates used are also from the Ifs).
² Bilateral Distance: in km, from S{J Wei's website and from various sources (\How far is it ?",
http://www.indo.com/distance )
² Transportation Costs: cost of shipping a ton between the two main cities of two countries (in
USD, per kg) with Ups. From Ups websites of the di®erent source countries.
² Other Geography Variables: various sources (especially A. Rose's website)
² Trade Agreements : various sources (especially A. Rose's website)
² Corruption: \Corruption Perception Index" from Transparency International
67 ranking from 0 to
10 (actually we use the opposite of the standard index to have the maximum value for the most
corrupted country)
² Common Language and Colonial Link: various sources (for colonial link, mainly summaries
of country history in Encyclop½dias.)
² Legal Variable: mainly La Porta et al. [1998], various sources for missing countries
68.
² Fiscal Variables: Ibfd online products (http://www.ibfd.org); Latin American Taxation Data-
base, European Taxation Database, Asia{Paci¯c Taxation Database, Tax Treaties Database.
² Stock Market Returns: monthly data from 1990 to 2000 in USD Dollars from Martin and Rey




² Importer Countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom,
United States;
² Exporter Countries:
{ Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,United King-
dom, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Lithuania, Poland, Russia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey;
{ Asia & Oceania: China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singa-
pore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand;
{ Oceania: Australia, New Zealand;
{ North America: Canada, United States;
{ South America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela;
{ Central America: Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama;
{ Africa: Algeria, C^ ote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia.
5.2 Empirical Results
























{18.791 1.336 {18.780 {23.605 {13.678 1152
log(Distanceij) 8.249 0.032 8.693 4.025 9.884 1159
TranspCostij 1.150 0.23 1.156 0.134 1.571 1098
(TranspCostij)
2 1.382 0.496 1.352 0.018 2.470 1098
AreaiAreaj 24.738 0.077 24.550 16.840 32.956 1159
Retj 0.027 0.099 0.040 {0.314 0.274 1159
Correlationij 0.311 0.219 0.313 {0.269 0.872 1159
Corruptioni {7.716 0.038 {7.7 {5.2 {9.7 1159
Corruptionj {5.595 0.07 {4.9 {1.6 {9.7 1140
InterestTaxij 8.505 0.217 10 0 40 1155
DividendTaxij 13.429 0.237 15 0 40 1155
FiscalTreatyij 15.862 0.450 14 0 76 1159




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Naive Ols System Ols Instrument Set # 1 Instrument Set # 2























































N. Obs. 977 977 977 977 977 977 977 977
R
2
0:702 0:728 0:717 0:746 0:581 0:738 0:583 0:739
Table A. 3: Simultaneous Gravity Model for Bilateral Imports and Banking Assets under Spec. # 3.
Standard errors in parentheses.













































a The Instrument Set of Imports over Gdps has been reduced from the standard one: the exogeneity of  
TransportCostij
2 in this dimension was rejected by the Overidentifying Restrictions Test. The remaining instruments for
Imports are then LandLockij, TransportCostij and AreaiAreaj.
d P{values in parentheses.
32Naive Ols System Ols Instrument Set # 1 Instrument Set # 2












































Expected Bias ¡0:246 ¡0:036 ¡0:307 ¡0:097
N. Obs. 999 999 999 999 999 999 999 999
R
2

























































Expected Bias ¡0:273 ¡0:045 ¡0:328 ¡0:113
N. Obs. 999 999 999 999 999 999 999 999
R
2

























































Expected Bias ¡0:296 ¡0:092 ¡0:373 ¡0:199
N. Obs. 999 999 999 999 999 999 999 999
R
2
0:755 0:771 0:764 0:781 0:63 0:777 0:629 0:778
Table A. 4: Simultaneous Gravity Model for Bilateral Imports and Bilateral Cpi Assets.
Standard errors in parentheses.




























































































































































Table A. 5: Gravity Models for Banking Claims, including Bilateral Exports and Imports.




















¡ ¯A log(Distij) + °AZ
3A
ij + ±ARetj + "A
ij
Naive Ols System Ols Instrument Set # 1 Instrument Set # 2










































Expected Bias ¡0:132 ¡0:017 ¡0:198 ¡0:077
N. Obs. 452 452 452 452 452 452 452 452
R
2



























































Expected Bias ¡0:223 ¡0:245 ¡0:294 ¡0:398
N. Obs. 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525
R
2
0:271 0:369 0:317 0:409 0:306 0:387 0:304 0:39
Table A. 6: Simultaneous Gravity Model for Bilateral Imports and Bilateral Banking Claims, Emerging
Vs. Developed Countries.
Standard errors in parentheses.









































345.3 Estimating an upper-bound for the e®ect of distance on asset holdings
(resp. on trade in goods)
Let us consider the following model where fA;T;Dg means respectively bilateral Asset Holdings, bilateral
Import of Goods and bilateral Distance:
A = ÁAT + ¯AD + "A
T = ÁTA + ¯TD + "T
We refer to this model as the \true model". For sake of clarity in the demonstration, we drop the
other control variables from this model but a similar reasoning can be made when other covariates are
included (see below).
The First-Stage regressions are the following:
A = ¾A + 'AIA + »A = b A + »A
T = ¾T + 'TIT + »T = b T + »T
where IA and IT are the set of instruments for A and T , b A and b T are the predicted value of A and
T.
Let us consider the \true model" for Asset Holdings and its 2Sls{estimated counterpart.
A = ÁAT + ¯AD + uA
A = c ÁA b T + c ¯AD + b uA
Taking the covariance with Distance leads to
69:
cov(A;D) = ÁAcov(T;D) + ¯AV (D) + cov(uA;D) = c ÁAcov(b T;D) + c ¯AV (D) + cov(b uA;D)
As far as D is \exogenous" and then orthogonal to the structural disturbances uA (and b uA), one gets
the expected bias of the estimated c ¯A:
E(c ¯A ¡ ¯A) = E
Ã
ÁAcov(»T;D) ¡ (b ÁA ¡ ÁA)cov(b T;D)
V (D)
!
the instrumental variable estimator is asymptotically convergent, thus the expected asymptotical
bias of the second stage estimate of ¯A is:





= E (ÁAcorr(»T;D)V (»T))
Respectively, the bias on the estimate of ¯T is:





= E (ÁTcorr(»A;D)V (»A))
This procedure is valid for any proper instrument IT. A simple calculus of the right hand side of those
expressions gives an estimate of the magnitude of the bias.
Note that when distance is included in the set of instruments: cov(»T;D) = 0 and the bias is expected
to be zero.
69The operator cov is for the covariance and V for the variance.
35However, given the strong predictive power of bilateral distance on goods trade, adding distance in
the set of instruments raises multicollinearity issues in the second step.
Theoretically, these expressions of the bias do not give information on its sign but empirically
corr(»i;D) is found to be negative: then c ¯A (resp. c ¯T) gives an upper-bound of the true e®ect of
distance on asset holdings (resp. trade in goods).
We can estimate the bias in presence of control variables; we just have to redo the same reasoning in
the orthogonal of those control variables :
A = ÁAT + ¯AD + °AZA + "A
T = ÁTA + ¯TD + °TZT + "T
A = b A + »A
T = b T + »T
A = ÁAT + ¯AD + °AZA + uA
A = c ÁA b T + c ¯AD + c °AZA + b uA
We introduce P
?






ZAD + uA = c ÁAP
?
ZA
b T + c ¯AP
?
ZAD + b uA
since P
?
ZAuA = uA (resp. P
?
ZAb uA = b uA)





ZAD;D) = c ÁAcov(P
?
ZA
b T;D) + c ¯Acov(P
?
ZAD;D)
since uA (resp. b uA) is orthogonal to D.
Rewriting this expression and taking expectations (using ÁA = E(c ÁA)) gives the expression of the
bias in presence of control variables:
E
³










This expression is similar to the previous one; the only di®erence is that we have project on the
orhogonal of the set of control variables. We also have:
E
³










This procedure is valid for any proper instrument IT. A simple calculus of the right hand side of those
expressions gives an estimate of the magnitude of the bias.
If fZA;Dg is included in the set of instrument, then: P
?











ZAU is hte residual of the Ols-regression of U on ZA.
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